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Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
SUMMARY
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations
are likely to figure in decisions by Congress
and the Administration on future aid to and
cooperation with Jordan.  These include the
stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic
reform under way in Jordan, the role of Jordan
in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s
concerns over the U.S.-led campaign against
Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other
regional states.  Following the 9/11 attacks,
Jordan issued bans on banking operations
linked to terrorist activities and pursued indi-
viduals linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
organization.  Jordan also sent military medi-
cal and mine clearing units to Afghanistan in
December 2001 to support the U.S.-led cam-
paign against terrorism, and a field hospital to
Iraq in April 2003 during Operation Iraqi
Freedom.  Jordan is also helping train Iraqi
police and military personnel in Iraq’s newly
organized security forces.  Jordan has been
targeted on several occasions by Al Qaeda
affiliates, most recently on November 9, 2005,
when near simultaneous explosions at three
western-owned hotels in the Jordanian capital
of Amman killed 58 persons.  A group allied
with bin Laden and known as “Al Qaeda in
Iraq”, headed by Jordanian-born Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility.
On October 24, 2000, the United States
and Jordan signed a free trade agreement.  On
September 28, 2001, President Bush signed a
bill to implement the agreement (H.R. 2603)
as P.L. 107-43.
In each of the five fiscal years 1998
through 2002, Jordan received  approximately
$225 million in annual U.S. assistance.  Jor-
dan received $450 million in FY2003, plus
over a billion dollars in a supplemental to help
Jordan deal with added expenses resulting
from the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.
The Administration requested $250
million in economic assistance and $206
million in military assistance for Jordan in
FY2004 and FY2005.  These amounts were
included in consolidated appropriations acts
for these two fiscal years (P.L. 108-199,
January 23, 2004, and P.L. 108-447, Decem-
ber  8, 2004).  In addition, the Administration
requested $100 million in economic assistance
for Jordan in FY2004 supplemental funds and
$200 million (split evenly between economic
and military assistance) for Jordan in FY2005
supplemental funds.  These amounts were
included in supplemental appropriations for
the two fiscal years (P.L. 108-106, November
6, 2003, and P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005).
The Administration requested $250
million in economic and $206 million in
military aid for Jordan in FY2006.  These
amounts were contained in both the House
and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill for FY2006.
Military aid was increased slightly to $210
million in the conference report (H.Rept. 109-
265), which the President signed on Novem-




On November 15, 2005, in the aftermath of three suicide bombings of western-owned
hotels in Jordan, King Abdullah accepted the resignations of the chief of the royal court (a
position roughly similar to the White House chief of staff), the national security advisor, and
nine other special advisors to the King.  The official announcement of these changes did not
mention the bombings and press reports indicate that some of the changes had been expected
for several months as part of a plan to restructure the royal court, but an unnamed Jordanian
official said these moves may have been accelerated as a result of the bombings.  On
November 28, King Abdullah swore in a new cabinet under soldier-turned-diplomat Marouf
al-Bakhit; the cabinet received a vote of confidence from the Jordanian parliament on
December 20.
On January 8, 2006, the lower house of the Jordanian parliament passed a measure
providing immunity to U.S. citizens and U.S. employees in Jordan from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court.  The measure had already been passed by the upper house.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they
have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years.  The
country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid
from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal
with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.  Jordan’s geographic position,
wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic
designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a
buffer between these potential adversaries.  In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied
coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf
states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role
in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Iraq.
Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest
Stability of the Regime and Succession
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or
semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of bedouin tribal
background.  The establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian
refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the
Jordan River (the “West Bank” territory; see below).  The original “East Bank” Jordanians,
through probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s
political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian
monarchy.  Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population, in many
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cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and some are at most lukewarm in
their support for the Jordanian regime.1
Jordan is an hereditary constitutional
monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite
family, which claims descent from the
Prophet Muhammad.  King Abdullah II has
ruled the country since 1999, when he
succeeded to the throne upon the death of
his father, the late King Hussein, upon the
latter’s death after a 47-year reign.
Educated largely in Britain and the United
States, King Abdullah had earlier pursued a
military career, ultimately serving as
commander of Jordan’s Special Operations
Forces with the rank of Major General.
There is currently no designated Crown
Prince; however, under Article 28 of the
Jordanian constitution, the King’s 11-year-
old son Prince Hussein is next in line of
succession to the throne.  King Abdullah
has won approval for his energetic and
hands-on style of governing; however,
some Jordanians, notably Palestinians and
Islamic fundamentalists, are opposed to his
policies of cooperating with the United
States on issues such as Iraq and the Arab-
Israeli peace process.
Course of Domestic Reforms
Political.  Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower
house and an appointed 55-member upper house.  Building on his father’s legacy, King
Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing
dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations with Israel.  The
most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62 seats in the 110-member
lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies of King Abdullah.  However, the
moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which had boycotted the previous
elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six
sympathizers.  Six seats in the lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a
member of the IAF.  The IAF also participated in municipal elections for the capital city of
Amman, held on July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest
against what IAF spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures.  The U.S. State
Department, in its most recent annual report on human rights (covering the year 2004),
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personnel 100,500; tanks 952;
combat aircraft 101
External
Debt (2004): $8.4 billion
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other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;
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some abuses, particularly by police and security forces.  Recent changes to press and penal
laws have broadened freedom of the press, but some restrictions remain.
Economic.  Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has
undertaken various measures in the last few years to improve its economy.  Since April 2000,
when Jordan joined the World Trade Organization, the country has carried out various
legislative and regulatory reforms.  Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces are slow
economic growth, declining living standards, and high levels of unemployment, nominally
around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.  After sluggish
economic growth during much of the 1990s, Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew
by 4% to 5% during the 2000-2002 timeframe; GDP growth subsequently dropped to 3.2%
in 2003, due in part to the effect of the Iraq war on tourism and other sectors of Jordan’s
economy, but rose to an estimated 5.4% in 2004.  The London-based Economic Intelligence
Unit forecasts GDP growth of 5.5% in 2005 and 2006.  Jordan’s external debt was $8.4
billion in 2004 (up from $7.6 billion in 2003), representing about 75.7% of GDP in 2004
(down from 81.3% in 2003).2  In  recent unpopular measures dictated by budgetary pressures,
the government has cut subsidies on fuels twice, in July and September 2005, effectively
raising the price of various fuels by increments ranging from 8% to 59%, in an effort to
correct the impact of burgeoning oil prices.
Recent Governmental Changes.  On November 15, 2005, in the aftermath of
suicide bombings at three Jordanian hotels (discussed below), the King accepted the
resignations of the chief of the royal court (a position roughly similar to the White House
chief of staff), the national security advisor, and nine other special advisors to the King.  The
official announcement of these changes did not mention the bombings and press reports
indicate that some of the changes had been expected for several months as part of a plan to
restructure the royal court.  An unnamed senior Jordanian official told Reuters news agency
that these moves “may have been speeded up by the tragic events [i.e., the hotel bombings]
but the decision itself has nothing to do with it.”
In further changes apparently linked to the hotel bombings, on November 27 King
Abdullah swore in a new cabinet under veteran soldier-turned-diplomat Marouf al-Bakhit,
with a mandate to launch an all-out war on terrorism.  Bakhit, who had recently served as
ambassador to Turkey and Israel and briefly after the hotel bombings as director of national
security, expressed a commitment to reform, commenting that “reform and security are
compatible.”  On December 20 the cabinet won a vote of confidence from the 110-member
Jordanian lower house of parliament by 86 to 20, with one abstention and three absentees.
Professional Associations.  Jordan’s 14 professional associations consisting of
approximately 130,000 members have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and
nationalist groups opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S.
policies on Iraq.  The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these
associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations.  More recently, the
government has circulated a draft law which alters the electoral procedures for professional
associations in a way that would dilute the influence of Islamist candidates and prohibit ties
IB93085 01-19-06
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to association branches in the Palestinian territories.3  The law was debated in parliament but
not enacted during the summer of 2005.  On August 24, Prime Minister Badran told reporters
that the government would not withdraw the controversial bill but that the bill would include
some unspecified amendments. 
Jordan and the War on Terrorism
 
Jordan has taken various steps to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism.  On
October 9, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Jordanian government
issued an amendment to terrorism laws banning any banking operations “linked to terrorism
activities,” along with banning border infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping,
telecommunications, and computer systems.4 In December 2001, during the U.S.-led
Operation Enduring Freedom, Jordan sent approximately 200 military medical personnel to
Afghanistan to set up a 50-bed field hospital in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif.  A
Jordanian Army mine-clearing unit, also deployed to Afghanistan during December, helped
clear 70,000 square meters of territory including a key air base of anti-tank and anti-
personnel mines.  According to the State Department’s most recent annual report on
terrorism (published April 27, 2005), “Jordan continued its strong support for the global war
on terrorism in 2004.” In particular, Jordanian authorities have arrested and prosecuted
individuals linked to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization and to a
bin Laden associate, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been
associated with several terrorist acts in Jordan.
Murder of a U.S. Diplomat.  Zarqawi has been linked to the murder on October 28,
2002, of Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) program in Jordan, who was shot and killed by an unknown assailant
as Foley was leaving for work. Press reports on May 12, 2003, indicated that a Jordanian
military prosecutor charged 11 men with “plotting to carry out terrorist activities leading to
the death of an individual” [presumably referring to Mr. Foley].  Five of the accused pleaded
innocent in court proceedings on July 8, 2003; the other six were tried in absentia.
According to press reports (New York Times, April 6 and 7, 2004) a Jordanian military court
convicted and sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably
involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one
defendant.  Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi.
Plot, 2004.  Zarqawi has also been linked to a reported plot by a terrorist cell to launch
a chemical attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman, with large-scale casualties.  According
to press reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited Iraq, where he
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obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack.
The plot was reportedly foiled by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series
of operations mounted in late April 2004.
Abortive Rocket Attack, 2005.   On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at
two U.S. amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed
their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third
rocket struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat.  A Jordanian soldier was
killed and another injured in the attack.  There were two claims of responsibility, both from
groups believed to be affiliated with bin Laden or his associate Zarqawi: the Brigades of the
Martyr Abdullah Azzam and the terrorist group Al Qaeda in Iraq, headed by Zarqawi.5  On
August 22, Jordanian television reported the arrest of a Syrian suspect, noting that three other
suspects had escaped to Iraq.  Some analysts have speculated that this attack is an indication
that Zarqawi may be expanding his operations to target Arab regimes with close relations to
the United States.
Hotel Bombings.  On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three
western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58
persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others.  The terrorist organization Al-
Qaeda in Iraq headed by Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the act, according to a statement
on a website often used by Zarqawi’s organization.  The statement alleged that four Iraqis
including a married couple, whom it described as “martyrdom seekers,” carried out the
planning and implementation of the bombing.  Jordanian authorities arrested the woman,
Sajida Mubarak al-Rishawi, who survived when her explosive belt failed to detonate.  Ms.
Rishawi, whose videotaped confession was broadcast on Jordan’s state-run television on
November 13, was the sister of three Iraqi insurgents who were killed in previous encounters
with U.S. forces in Iraq; one of them was a top deputy to Zarqawi.  Jordanian officials
blamed Zarqawi’s organization but have not formally identified the nationality of the
perpetrators.  In a CNN interview on November 12, King Abdullah speculated that the
perpetrators might have crossed into Jordan from Syria or Iraq.
Some commentators believe Zarqawi, though allied with bin Laden, has established his
organization as a competitive force to Al-Qaeda and is seeking to expand the range of his
organization’s operations beyond Iraq to target regional governments that support the U.S.-
led campaign in Iraq and mount attacks on Israel as well.6  However, many Jordanians, even
some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies, have
condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and have denounced
Zarqawi’s actions.  King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians,
not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned, were frequented by local
citizens.  On November 15, Jordan’s Minister of the Interior announced new security
regulations designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including
a requirement for Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or
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a house to foreigners.  An official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun
drafting new and tougher anti-terrorism laws which will probably be ready for parliamentary
debate early in 2006.
Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations
Peace Agreements and Normalization.  Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty
on October 26, 1994.  Subsequently, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel
returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the
Jordanian Parliament  repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries
signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and
cultural links.  Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000
cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent
to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an
annex to the peace treaty).
Opposition to Normalization.  King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with
Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic
fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and
professional organizations (see above).  Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some
disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to
them so far.  Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott
contacts with Israel, and activists among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian
individuals and companies that deal with Israel.  The Jordanian government has arrested
organizers of these lists, but courts have upheld their right to publish them.
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations.  Jordan supports current Middle East peace
plans, including a land-for-peace initiative proposed by Saudi then-Crown Prince Abdullah
and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002; and the Road Map, a three-phase process
released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the
United Nations) on April 30, 2003, in an effort to jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process.  On June 4, 2003, King Abdullah hosted a summit conference at the Red Sea port
of Aqaba attended by President Bush and the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers, where
attendees discussed steps to implement the Road Map.  Despite the subsequent breakdown
of Israeli-Palestinian talks, King Abdullah continued to press for resumption of negotiations.
Jordan initially opposed an Israeli proposal to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and
four West Bank towns, but later expressed support as long as the withdrawal was part of the
Road Map process.7  At a conference on February 8, 2005, hosted by Egyptian President
Mubarak and attended by the leaders of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority,
Mubarak and King Abdullah issued a joint statement that hailed the spirit of cooperation
shown at the conference by Israeli and Palestinian leaders and expressed hopes for further
progress on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace tracks as well.  On February 20,
2005, Jordan sent a new ambassador, Marouf al-Bakhit, to Israel after a four-year vacancy
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in the post during the Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli occupation.  (As noted
above, Bakhit was reassigned as director of national security after the hotel bombings and
appointed prime minister on November 27.)  More recently, in an interview with Israel
Broadcasting Authority TV Channel One on September 9, 2005, shortly after the Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza and four small West settlements (see below), King Abdullah
commented that “Gaza has given us an opportunity, and Jordan is ready to step up to the
plate and work alongside the Israelis and the Palestinians to really think of tomorrow.”  He
mentioned a previously discussed project to increase water supplies by a canal linking the
Red Sea with the Dead Sea (“the Red-Dead Canal”).  
The West Bank and East Jerusalem.  The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty does not
address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan in 1950 but
occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East Jerusalem (except as noted
below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian rather than Israeli-Jordanian
negotiations.  The late King Hussein decided in August 1988 “to disengage our legal and
administrative relations with the West Bank,” but he and King Abdullah remained involved
in Palestinian issues.  Gaza never came under Jordanian control and has not figured
significantly in Israeli-Jordanian discussions until recently, as noted above.
Jerusalem.  On a related issue, Palestinian leaders have taken exception to Article 9
of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty, which states that Israel “respects the historical role of
the Hashemite Kingdom [of Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem” and “will give high
priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.”  The late Palestinian leader Arafat
asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.”
In a speech to a Washington, DC audience on May 13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under
a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing
for a shared city open to all faiths.”
Training and Deployments.  During his comments to the press on May 6, 2004,
King Abdullah told President Bush that “Jordan is ready to do its part in assisting the
Palestinian Authority to rebuild its capability and assume full control of the security
situation.”  Jordanian officials have suggested that Jordan would consider training Palestinian
police to maintain security in Gaza and parts of the West Bank if Israel continued efforts to
implement the Road Map.  In an interview with Lally Weymouth published in the
Washington Post on May 22, 2005, the King commented that “[w]e in Jordan are trying to
assist in training Palestinian policemen,” as are the Americans and Egyptians.  In addition,
according to Jordanian officials, Jordan has offered to deploy a group of 1,500 Palestinians
comprising the “Badr Brigade,” officially part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization but
trained by the Jordanian Armed Forces, to the West Bank to help with internal security.8 
Hamas and Rejectionist Groups.  On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces
closed offices used by the fundamentalist Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late
King Hussein had tolerated to some degree, on the grounds that the offices were registered
as businesses but were conducting illegal political activity.  In November 1999, authorities
announced that the Hamas offices would be closed permanently.   However, King Abdullah
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condemned the Israeli missile strike that killed Hamas spiritual leader Ahmad Yasin in Gaza
on March 22, 2004, commenting that “[t]his crime will lead to more escalation, violence and
instability.”
Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations
Iraq: Jordanian Policy Toward the War and Its Aftermath.  Though not in
favor of military action against Iraq, Jordan informally provided logistical support to the
U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein in the spring of 2003.9  Since mid-2003, Jordan
has broadened contacts with the U.S.-sponsored interim government in Iraq, assisted in the
reconstruction of Iraq, and conducted training at Jordanian installations for selected units of
a new Iraqi army and police force.  Jordan strongly supported the elections held in Iraq on
January 30, 2005, for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), under a timetable adopted
early in 2004.  Jordanian leaders have been concerned, however, that the growing power of
Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim majority could lead to a wider role for Iran in influencing Iraqi affairs.
In December 2004, King Abdullah (a Sunni Muslim) expressed concern that Iran was trying
to manipulate Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims in an effort to bring about an Islamic republic similar to
the Iranian model in Iraq.10  He has also voiced concern over the possibility of Sunni-Shi’ite
conflict within the region.11  The King has been careful to point out that the leaders of Jordan
“do not have a problem with Shi’ites” and has emphasized that his concerns are political, not
religious.  During a meeting on January 16, 2006, the prime ministers of Jordan and Turkey
agreed on the need to preserve Iraqi unity and called for an Iraqi national government that
represents all Iraqis.
Iraq Training and Troop Support.  In a September 2003 interview, the King said
Jordan would train approximately 30,000 Iraqi police and military personnel in Jordan,
pointing out that he did not plan to send Jordanian trainers to Iraq in view of the sensitivities
involved.  In a subsequent interview with Defense News published on February 9, 2004, King
Abdullah explained that Iraqi army personnel are being trained by the Jordanian Army, while
Iraqi police training is a joint venture with private sector companies.  According another
Defense News article on the same date, more than 35,000 military and police personnel,
slightly more than the earlier figure cited by King Abdullah, will undergo training in Jordan.
Training of Iraqi police cadets is being conducted at six police training academies, five of
which are in Iraq and one of which is at Muwaqqar, Jordan, east of Amman.  This center,
known as the Jordan International Police Training Center, has instructors from 15 countries,
IB93085 01-19-06
12 “Over 1,400 Iraq Police Recruits Complete Jordan Training,” Dow Jones International News,
January 13, 2005.
13 Communication from a Jordanian official, October 7, 2005.
14 “Egypt Becomes First Arab Country to Name Ambassador to Iraq,” AFP, June 22, 2005, 9:52am.
Jordan, on its part, had earlier been a victim of terrorism in Iraq, when a car bomb exploded outside
the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, killing as many as 17 persons; authorities
have mentioned several extremist groups, including one with alleged ties to Al Qaeda known as
Ansar al-Islam, as possible perpetrators of the bombing.
15 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraq Accuses Jordan of Allowing Financing of Insurgency,” New York
Times, August 22, 2005.
CRS-9
including Jordan.12  According to Jordanian officials, as of October 7, 2005, a total of 35,000
Iraqi police cadets are undergoing six-week training courses in Jordan; approximately two
thirds have completed their training and returned to Iraq.13  Earlier, as of January 2005,
approximately 1,650 Iraqi soldiers, including 50 women, had graduated from a training
program at the Jordanian Military Academy at Zarqa, 17 miles north of Amman.  Previously,
in an interview with Al-Arabiyya TV on August 3, 2004, King Abdullah mentioned that
Jordan had sent military equipment to the reconstituted Iraq army, including more than 150
armored vehicles.
In his The Middle East Quarterly interview, King Abdullah said he planned to use some
Iraqi troops who had undergone training in Jordan as instructors for future Iraqi trainees in
Jordan’s training program.  He also suggested joint training cycles in which Jordanian and
Iraqi military units would be matched and conduct training exercises together, as well as a
possible Jordanian role in establishing an Iraqi air force.
Suicide Bombing in Iraq, 2005.  On February 28, 2005, a suicide bomber killed an
estimated 118 people in the southern Iraqi town of Hilla.  Newspapers have identified the
perpetrator as Raed Mansour al-Banna, a Jordanian with alleged links to Zarqawi’s group.
Reports that Banna’s family and friends in Jordan had celebrated his action fueled anti-
Jordan demonstrations in Iraq and protests by Iraqi officials, despite condemnations of the
bombing by Jordanian officials.  Following mounting tensions, Iraq and Jordan briefly
withdrew their top diplomats from each other’s capitals on March 20.  King Abdullah sent
his charge d’affaires, Dimai Haddad,  back to Baghdad on the following day in an effort to
ease bilateral tensions.  A visit by Iraq’s transitional President Jalal Talabani on May 7 eased
tensions further and resulted in the return of the Iraqi ambassador to Jordan.  (Iraq is
represented by an ambassador in Amman, while at the time Jordan has been represented by
a charge d’affaires in Baghdad since 2003.  On June 22, 2005, Jordan’s foreign minister
announced that Jordan will send an ambassador to Baghdad in the near future.)14  Some
frictions continue, as is evidenced by Iraqi spokesman Laith Kubbah’s allegation that
members of Saddam Hussein’s family and former Iraqi officials currently in exile in Jordan
are providing financial and media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize
the banned Ba’th Party in Iraq.15  Also,  Iraq has demanded that Jordan extradite former Iraqi
Defense Minister Hazim Sha’lan, whom Iraqi authorities accuse of embezzlement and who
is reportedly in Jordan.  In a news conference on October 3, 2005, Jordanian Deputy Prime
Minister Marwan Muasher disclaimed any Jordanian involvement in the Sha’lan case and
denied that Jordan has been asked to extradite him.  After the triple bombings of Jordanian
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hotels in November 2005 by terrorists from Iraq, Deputy Prime Minister Muasher told a news
conference that there is on-going cooperation between Jordan and Iraq on terrorism.
Sources of Oil Supply.  During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil products from Iraq.
Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments were made in commodities
rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from Jordan to Iraq.  These
transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program; however, the United
Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that it had no other source of oil, and U.S.
administrations waived legislation that would have penalized Jordan for these transactions
on this basis. After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan
received some oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a
temporary basis.  According to Jordan’s foreign minister, Saudi Arabia made a commitment
to supply Jordan with 50% of its oil needs (50,000 barrels per day) until March 2004.  A
Jordanian spokesperson, quoted in the Jordanian press on May 6, 2004, said Saudi Arabia
had decided to extend the oil grant to Jordan for one year.  Saudi Arabia terminated the
shipments (which had been gratis) in April 2005, and Jordan has been obtaining its oil needs
(100,000 barrels per day) from Saudi Arabia at international market prices.  To ease the
financial burden on Jordan, Saudi Arabia is providing Jordan with $20 million per month in
direct support, but these payments will be terminated on April 30, 2006.
Other Issues.  In his Washington Post interview of May 22, 2005, King Abdullah said
Jordan is reviewing the case of former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, now a deputy prime
minister of Iraq, who was convicted by a Jordanian military court in 1992 of embezzlement.
The King said he had been asked by Iraqi transitional President Jalal Talabani to look into
this matter.
Other Regional Relations
Relations with Iran.  Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the
establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran
was promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan.  There were  indications of a warming trend
between the two countries during mid-2004, however, at least on the commercial level.
During a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3, 2004 — the first by a
Jordanian ruler in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade and security.  Also,
according to the Iranian news agency, the leaders “welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi
Governing Council, and described it as a step towards handing over the power to the Iraqi
people.”  Asked about Iran’s nuclear program during his September 28, 2004  interview, then
Foreign Minister Muasher reiterated Jordan’s view that there should be a nuclear freeze in
the Middle East including “Israel, Iran, and the others.”  Responding to another question,
concerning Iranian activity in Iraq, Muasher said “[w]e have always asked all neighboring
countries not to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs....” (As noted above, Jordanian officials
have expressed concern about possible Iranian manipulation of the Iraqi political scene.)
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U.S. Aid and Trade Issues
Aid and Funding Levels
Previous and Recent Aid.  The United States has provided economic and military
aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and 1957.  Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2003
amounted to approximately $7 billion, including $4 billion in economic aid and $3 billion
in military aid.  Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by
Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid
funding.  The United States has markedly increased its aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to
help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain domestic stability, and pursue normalization
with Israel.  Between FY1998 and FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to
Jordan were approximately $150 million and $75 million, respectively.  In addition to annual
aid funds, at the request of the Clinton Administration, Jordan received $300 million as part
of a special package spread over FY1999 and FY2000 to support the Wye River agreement,
a U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian agreement that the late King Hussein had helped
negotiate in 1998.  Also, at the request of the Bush Administration, Jordan received an
additional $125 million in a supplemental FY2002 appropriation for U.S. allies supporting
the U.S. campaign against terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  In FY2003, the aid to
Jordan was almost doubled, amounting to $250 million in economic and $198 million in
military assistance.  In addition, Jordan received $700 million in economic and $406 million
in military assistance in supplemental funding, to help offset the effects of the war with Iraq
on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security.  Table 1 shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance
to Jordan since 1990.
FY2004 Assistance.  In its budget request for FY2004, the Administration requested
$250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan.  These amounts were included in
S. 1426, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation
Bill, 2004, which was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2003
(S.Rept. 108-106).  The House version, H.R. 2800, reported by the House Appropriations
Committee on July 21, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-222) and passed on July 24 by 370-50 (Roll no.
429), contained the requested level of ESF, and it recommended the requested level of FMF
in report language.  The Senate subsequently passed its own version of H.R. 2800 by voice
vote on October 30, 2003.  Provisions of H.R. 2800 were incorporated into H.R. 2673, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2004.  The accompanying conference report (H.Rept.
108-401, November 25, 2003) contained the requested levels of ESF and FMF for Jordan.
The conference report was agreed to by the House on December 8, 2003, and the Senate on
January 22, 2004; the bill was signed into law as P.L. 108-199 on January 23, 2004.
Also, on November 6, 2003, the President signed H.R. 3289, the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriation for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan,
2004, as P.L. 108-106.  This act contains an additional $100 million for Jordan in ESF.
FY2005 Assistance.  The Administration requested $250 million in ESF and $206
million in FMF for Jordan in FY2005, in addition to small amounts for IMET, de-mining
operations, and Peace Corps (see Table 1). H.R. 4818, the Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill for FY2005, passed by the House by 365-41 on July 15, 2004 (Roll no.
390), contains $250 million in ESF for Jordan.  Meanwhile, the House Committee on
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Appropriations had recommended full funding of the Administration’s ESF and FMF
requests for Jordan in accompanying report language (H.Rept. 108-599, July 13, 2004).  A
Senate bill, S. 2812, reported on September 16, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-346), provided the
amounts requested by the Administration.  The Senate bill also stated that of the ESF funds
available to Jordan, $5,000,000, should be made available to a charitable institution, the
Rosary Sisters Hospital in Jordan.  The Senate then passed its own version of H.R. 4818,
after substituting the language in S. 2812, on September 23, 2004, by voice vote.  The
conference report (H.Rept. 108-792, November 20, 2004) contained the economic and
military aid amounts requested by the Administration; it dropped the $5 million earmark for
the Rosary Sisters Hospital because of Jordanian concerns over the impact this would have
on the overall assistance program for Jordan.  The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
was included as Division D of H.R. 4818, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2005,
which was signed by the President as P.L. 108-447 on December 8, 2004.
The Administration requested $100 million in ESF and $100 million in FMF for Jordan
as part of an emergency supplemental appropriation bill for FY2005, in recognition of
Jordan’s assistance in the war on terrorism and the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces.
These amounts are contained in H.R. 1268, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill
for FY2005, which was signed by the President as P.L. 109-13 on May 11, 2005.
FY2006 Assistance.  For FY2006, the Administration has requested for Jordan the
same amounts it requested in FY2005: $250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF.  Both
the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for
FY2006, contain the amounts requested by the Administration.  The respective versions of
this bill were passed by the House on June 28, 2005 (by 393-32, Roll no. 335) and the Senate
on July 20, 2005 (98-1, Recorded Vote number 197).  The conference report (H.Rept. 109-
265) increased FMF slightly to $210 million; the House agreed to the conference report on
November 4 (by 358-39, Roll no. 569) and the Senate agreed to it on November 10 (by 91-0,
Recorded Vote number 320).  The President signed the bill on November 14 as P.L. 109-102.
Other Funds.  In addition to the preceding funds specifically earmarked for Jordan,
the last three emergency supplemental bills contain funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and
other key cooperation states for logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations:
$1.4 billion in FY2003; $1.15 billion in FY2004; and $1.37 billion in FY2005.  Also, the
FY2005 supplemental contains $99 million to assist Jordan in establishing a regional training
center to help regional military forces, security forces, and individuals in meeting existing
and emerging threats.
Trade Issues
Jordan ranked 69th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United
States in 2004, up slightly from 74th in 2003.  According to the U.S. International Trade
Commission, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from $317 million to $531
million between 2000 and 2004, and Jordan’s exports to the United States increased even
more notably from $73 million to $1,093 million during the same period.  Principal U.S.
commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and appliances,
vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main exports to the United States included clothing and
accessories, precious stones, and precious metals.  Two recent measures, in particular, have
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helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S.
investment in Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement.  On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and King
Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which will
eliminate duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services originating
in the two countries.  Earlier, in a report released on September 26, the U.S. International
Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement would have no
measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment.
Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker
rights and environmental protection.  On January 6, 2001, then President Clinton transmitted
to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement.  On July 23, then
U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher
exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve disputes
without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures.  These letters were designed to
allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the possible use of sanctions
to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty.  President Bush signed H.R.
2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King
Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the September 11, 2001, attacks.  For additional
information, see CRS Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane
Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones.  An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced
with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the United States duty free,
under the provisions of P.L. 104-234.  This act amended previous legislation so as to grant
the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free trade area to cover products from QIZs
between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt.  QIZs were designed both to help the
Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan
and Israel.  Since 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative has designated thirteen industrial
parks in Jordan as QIZs, of which three are publicly operated and ten are privately owned.
Seven of these QIZs are active; three are not yet active; and two are in the process of
becoming active, according to a fact sheet provided by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington
on August 21, 2003.  A joint Israeli-Jordanian committee including an observer from the
United States approves products produced in the QIZs and certifies their eligibility for duty
free entry into the United States.16  According to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance, QIZ
exports amounted to $582 million in the year 2003.17  Even with the establishment of the
QIZs, however, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.  According
to recent estimates, Israeli annual exports to Jordan and imports from Jordan are running at
approximately $31.7 million and $34.2 million respectively, while comparable figures a
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decade ago were $20.5 million and $29.9 million respectively.18  For additional information,
see CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting
Peace and Stability in the Middle East?, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy
Sharp. 
Reform and Development Initiatives
King Abdullah and other senior Jordanian officials have repeatedly emphasized that
change is necessary for Jordan’s survival but that a reform process should be internally
driven.  On March 11, 2004, then Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher told a Washington
audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars that “[w]e do not differ over the
content of this reform” but went on to say that such a program should not be “imposed, or
perceived to be imposed, in any way, from the outside.”  The King subsequently formed a
National Agenda Committee headed by Dr. Muasher (now Deputy Prime Minister) to
develop a road map to reforming economic and political life.  An article in the Beirut-based
Daily Star on November 16, 2005 indicates that the committee will shortly release a 10-year
plan for comprehensive reform of eight sectors: education, infrastructure, employment, social
welfare, finances, judiciary, investment, and political development.  According to the article,
political development has been the most controversial, pitting liberal reformists against
conservative and traditional forces.  Meanwhile, Jordan has also been the recipient of several
grants under the U.S.-sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program for
projects in the political, economic, educational, and women’s fields.
Armed Forces Modernization
Military Equipment.  The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces,
which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime.  The Jordanian military forces,
though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of Jordan’s
neighboring forces.  In 1996, under Section 572, P.L. 104-107 (the FY1996 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act), Congress approved a drawdown of $100 million, mainly in
ground force equipment from U.S. stocks (including 50 M60A3 tanks), to enhance Jordan’s
ability to maintain border security and implement terms of the peace treaty with Israel.  Most
of this equipment was delivered in December 1996.  In addition, during 1996, the United
States agreed to lease 16 refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft to Jordan at a cost of approximately
$220 million (most of which represents the cost of upgrading the aircraft), with title passing
to Jordan after five years.  Deliveries of the aircraft were completed in early 1998.  The
aircraft transfer was funded through a combination of foreign military financing (FMF)
allocations to Jordan over a four-year period ($150 million), plus $70 million in additional
FMF funds contained in the FY1996 omnibus continuing appropriations bill (P.L. 104-134).
More recently, with regard to the three Patriot anti-missile batteries delivered to Jordan
by the United States in early 2003, Jordan’s Prime Minister stated on February 25, 2003,  that
Jordan requested these weapons from the United States after Russia was unable to deliver
S-300 surface-to-air missiles originally requested by Jordan.  On November 19, 2004, the
U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a potential sale of 50 U.S. Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and associated equipment to Jordan to enhance the
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defense capability of Jordan’s F-16 fighter aircraft and provide for increased interoperability
with U.S. forces.
Military Cooperation.  A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned
since 1974.  Combined training exercises by U.S. and Jordanian military units continue to
take place in Jordan, at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often.  These have
included fairly large scale training activities involving special forces, air defense,
communications, fighter aircraft, and other military units, together with an annual month-
long exercise with U.S. Navy and Marine units called “Infinite Moonlight.”  In early 2002,
at U.S. request, Jordan reportedly began a training program to help Yemeni forces in
countering terrorism.  The above-mentioned courses conducted by Jordan for Iraqi military
personnel are reportedly being funded by the United States under a program called the New
Iraqi Army Training Project.19
Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended,
then President Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States,
effective on November 13, 1996.  According to a State Department spokesman, this status
“makes Jordan eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the
use of already appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial
leases, the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium
munitions.”
Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2005,
bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing the ICC from proceeding
against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned.  This act contains waiver authority
in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies of the United States.  A similar provision
is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
FY2006.  Jordan signed such an agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004;
however, the Jordanian lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special
session of parliament on July 14, 2005.  Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush
issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to Jordan for
six months.  (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on February 10, 2005,
though PD-2005-20.)  On January 8, 2006, however, the lower house reversed its July 2005
vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel
and U.S. employees working in Jordan.  The bill had already been endorsed by the upper
house, and the King is expected to sign it.
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Economic Assistance Military Assistance
Totals
EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp FMF* IMET**
1991 35.0a 0 0 0 20.0a 1.3 56.30
1992 30.0b 20.0 0 0 20.0b .6 70.60
1993c 5.0 30.0 0 0 9.0 .5 44.50
1994d 9.0 15.0 4.0 0 9.0 .8 37.80
1995 7.2 15.0 6.7 0 7.3 1.0 37.20
1996 7.2 21.0 7.9 0 200.0e 1.2 237.30
1997f 112.2 2.6 4.5 1.1 30.0 1.7 152.10
1998f 150.0 0 0 1.2 75.0g 1.6 227.80
1999 150.0 0 0 1.4 70.0g 1.6 223.00
1999 (Wye) 50.0 0 0 0 50.0 0 100.00
2000 150.0 0 0 1.7 75.0 1.6 228.30
2000 (Wye) 50.0 0 0 0 150.0 0 200.00h
2001 150.0 0 0 1.7 75.0 1.7 228.40
2002 150.0 0 0 1.6 75.0 2.0 228.60
2002 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 25.0 0 125.00
2003 250.0 0 0 1.0 198.0 2.4 451.40
2003 (Suppl.) 700.0 0 0 0 406.0 0 1,106.00
2004 250.0 0 0 2.3 206.0 2.9 461.20
2004 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 100.00
2005 250.0 0 0 1.6 206.0 3.0 460.60
2005 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 0 200.00
2006i 250.0 0 0 1.6 210.0 3.0 464.60
Note:  These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining
assistance.  Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in FY2001
(never acted upon by Congress).
*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program
a.  Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b.  Released in late July 1993.
c.  Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d.  FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e.  Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in
special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.  These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g.  For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h.  Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001or FY2002).
i.  Administration’s request for FY2006, with FMF slightly increased by the conference report on P.L. 109-102.
